Greece already lives next to nuclear power

What countries in the region already generate

The Greek debate on nuclear energy is often framed as if the country were deciding whether to bring a new technology into a region that does not have it. Eurostat’s generation data describe a different region.

In Bulgaria, nuclear accounted for 39.6 %1 of net electricity generation over the twelve months of 20251. It is not a supplementary source there: it is the largest single component of the Bulgarian mix.

In Romania, the share over the same period was 21.7 %1, roughly a fifth of the country’s generation1.

For Turkey the figure for the same twelve months was 0.0 %11. The country has a nuclear programme under way, but recorded no nuclear generation in the Eurostat series during the measured period. Zero here means "did not generate in this period", not "has no programme".

Greece’s share is zero, and the country has no nuclear power-generating installation of any kind. That is the starting point of every discussion of the subject. It is not the same thing as being remote from it.

Why this changes the question

None of this is an argument for or against nuclear power in Greece. "Others do it" proves nothing, and the reasons each country ended up with its own mix are historical, geographical and economic. They do not transfer from one country to the next.

What changes is the question being asked. "Do we want nuclear power in the region?" has already been answered, by others. The live question is whether Greece wants plants of its own, and what it would compare that option against. It is a harder question and a more useful one; the conditions it depends on are set out in Can Greece support a nuclear programme?

Greece already trades electricity with nuclear-heavy systems

Over the twelve months of 2025, Greece imported 3.4 TWh2 of electricity and exported 6.4 TWh22. The net import balance was -3.0 TWh2: a negative figure, meaning the country sent out more electricity than it brought in.

In 2025 Greece was a net electricity exporter2. The familiar picture of the country as a permanent energy importer did not hold for electricity that year. It does not make Greece energy self-sufficient: most of the fuel it generates with, mainly natural gas, is imported (lignite is domestic), and the electricity balance is a different quantity from the overall energy balance.

On the origin of imports, the largest share came, narrowly, from Bulgaria, at 33.3 %3 of total Greek electricity imports in 2024. Turkey supplied 12.4 %33. The annual partner-country series lags the monthly data, which is why these shares refer to 2024 while the import and export totals refer to 2025.

Put Bulgaria’s place in Greek imports next to the weight of nuclear in Bulgaria’s own generation, and the question "does Greece already consume nuclear electricity?" becomes a reasonable one to ask. For how the Greek system itself has changed, see Greece’s transition from lignite to solar.

Why no nuclear percentage can be calculated

The tempting step is to multiply: this share of imports from Bulgaria, that share of nuclear in Bulgaria, therefore this much nuclear electricity in Greek consumption. The calculation is wrong for two reasons.

The first is physical. A grid does not deliver addressed packets. Every unit feeds the same pool and every consumer draws from it; the flow on an interconnector is set by the physics of the network, not by commercial contracts. No kilowatt-hour carries the identity of the plant that generated it.

The second is accounting. Flows on an interconnector reverse within the same day, power arriving from one country may have originated in a third, and each country’s mix changes hour by hour. One annual average multiplied by another describes no moment that actually happened.

The answer is therefore qualitative. Greece is part of an interconnected system that includes nuclear generation, and it imports from countries that have it. How much of that reached a particular socket is not a measurable quantity.

Guarantees of origin do attribute a source to electricity. A certificate is issued for each unit of energy from a given source, it can be transferred, and its holder may declare that it consumed energy of that origin. The system serves a real purpose, but it records ownership of certificates, not a physical path. The same applies to the fuel-mix figures shown on bills and in reports: they are accounting constructs with clear rules, useful for comparison and policy, and should not be read as a description of what ran through the cable.

This cuts both ways in the Greek debate. "We already consume nuclear power, so let us build our own" does not hold, because the "already" cannot be measured in the way it implies, and importing energy is a very different commitment from owning a plant. "Nuclear power is no concern of ours because we have none" holds even less: Greece is electrically connected to systems that include it, geographically close to installations, and party to frameworks on nuclear safety.

Proximity: notification, assistance and monitoring

Radioactivity released in a serious accident does not stop at a border. That was Chernobyl’s lesson for Europe, and it is why the international framework was built in the form it has.

For a country without nuclear plants of its own, the consequence is asymmetric. It carries part of the risk from installations it does not decide on, license or inspect. That is not a theoretical problem, and having no plants of one’s own does not remove it.

Mechanisms exist to mitigate it. The international conventions on early notification of a nuclear accident and on assistance in the event of one create an obligation to notify and a framework for help. European mechanisms also exchange radiation measurement data in real time.

At national level, the Greek Atomic Energy Commission (EEAE), the country’s regulator, operates the telemetric network that measures environmental radioactivity, assesses the radiological situation and advises on protective measures; the response plans belong to Civil Protection. This does not depend on Greece ever acquiring a power plant. It exists because there are neighbours, medical and industrial radiation sources, and shipments of radioactive material. More on the regulator in Greece’s nuclear regulator, EEAE.

What a neighbouring state can and cannot do

Prime responsibility for the safety of a nuclear installation rests with the licence holder and cannot be delegated; the host state is responsible for the legal framework and the regulator. No neighbouring country has a veto over a licence another country issues.

The channels that do exist are not empty. The European framework provides consultation procedures for projects with possible transboundary effects, and international conventions cover transboundary environmental impact assessment. They give a right to be heard and access to information, not a right to decide.

Peer review is another tool: teams from other countries examine a regulator or an installation and publish their observations. For EU member states such as Bulgaria and Romania they are mandatory under Directive 2009/71/Euratom as amended by Directive 2014/87/Euratom: topical peer reviews every six years and a periodic international review. Their recommendations are not binding, but whether they are published and what follow-up they receive is itself information.

The realistic conclusion is that a neighbouring country’s influence is exercised through diplomacy, technical cooperation and publicity. It is real and limited, and it does not replace the regulator of the host country.

How to read news about plants in the region

Reports on nuclear projects across the border tend to mix very different things. Three questions sort most of them out.

• Is this an installation in operation, one under construction, or an announced intention? The three are often presented the same way, and they can be decades apart.
• Who is saying it? A vendor’s press release, a government announcement and a regulator’s report carry very different weight, and only the last has been through independent scrutiny.
• If an event is reported, at what level? An international scale exists for classifying nuclear and radiological events precisely so that they are not all read the same way. A low-level event that is recorded and published shows that the reporting system works; it is not proof of danger.

The editor works as an engineer in the nuclear sector. Views here are his own and do not represent any employer. The platform receives no funding from anyone. Not yet independently reviewed by a second engineer. Read in Greek.